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*1 STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE[FN1]
FN1. The brief is filed with the consent of all parties, as indicated by letters of consent filed with the Court. This
brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by any counsel for any party. No one other than amicus or its counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
The Conference of Chief Justices (“the Conference”) is the national voice of the State courts in the United States con-
cerning matters of importance in improving the administration of justice. The Conference is comprised of the Chief
Justices from the highest courts of each State, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Territories of American Samoa, Guam and the Virgin Islands.
The Conference unanimously authorized the filing of an amicus brief at its January 2002 meeting, and this brief has been
approved by a special committee of the Conference.
The unique challenges of judicial elections have led to special efforts by Chief Justices from States in which members of
the judiciary face election. In December 2000, the Chief Justices from the seventeen most populous such States convened
a Summit, chaired by Chief Justice Thomas R. Phillips of Texas, on Improving Judicial Selection. In January 2001, a
Call To Action was issued stating the Summit's recommendations. See Call To Action, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1353 (2001).
Among those recommendations were two that dealt with the Canons on judicial campaign activity. The Summit urged
that a Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct be held to “reexamine [the Canons] to assure that they promote fair
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elections while safeguarding the right to free speech.” That Symposium, chaired by Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard of
Indiana and co-hosted by seven other Chief Justices, was held in November 2001; a statement *2 of recommendations is
in process.[FN2] For the Summit and Symposium, staff services were provided by the National Center for State Courts,
which regularly provides such support for the Conference (and other organizations).
FN2. The Symposium papers will appear in 77 Ind. L.J. in the Spring of 2002.
In short, a substantial number of the members of the Conference, working through the National Center for State Courts,
have been acting together to study and recommend steps to address the complex issues presented by judicial elections.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Conference does not take any position on the language of the announce clause of the Minnesota Judicial Canon, or
any other Canon. The Conference urges this Court to decide the case in a way that preserves the States' flexibility to bal-
ance First Amendment concerns against other constitutional commitments to the Due Process rights of litigants and the
independence of the judiciary within a system of separated government powers. Because this Court's decision could af-
fect the conduct of judicial elections in thirty-nine States, the precise contours of its opinion will have national signific-
ance.
First, for well over a century, the States have worked to structure judicial elections so that judges could be selected by
voters without impairing the traditional role of an independent and impartial judiciary. States adopting elections for the
judiciary did so, in fact, to enhance their independence. Moreover, the thirty-nine States that select at least some of their
judges by election[FN3] have implemented an array of measures, through constitutional provisions, codes of conduct and
otherwise, designed specifically to preserve for the judiciary its traditional role even as judges are required to stand for
election. Contrary to the suggestion of other amici, the choice before the States has not been one between elections con-
ducted like all others, without reasonable and meaningful limits, or no elections at all. History shows that having adopted
elections, States are unlikely to eliminate them, but pursue instead “innovation and experimentation,” see Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991), in balancing the competing constitutional values. The States' historic commitment to
this balance merits careful consideration from this Court.
FN3. In seven States, no judges face elections; in four, probate judges are elected (Connecticut, Maine, South
Carolina and Vermont). Hereafter, we put aside those eleven States and address the thirty-nine others. See our
Appendix and A.B.A. Rep. & Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions (pt. 2)
app. 2 at 69-76 (1998) (hereinafter “ABA Task Force Report”) for a listing of the thirty-nine States with elec-
tions. Nationally, 86.9% of state judges face elections of some type; 53% of appellate judges and 77.3% of trial
judges (general jurisdiction) face contestable elections. Id. at 3 n. 1 (based on 1998 and 1996 sources).
Our Appendix, based on the ABA Task Force Report, supra, app. 1, shows just which States have what sys-
tem(s). This shows that: among the thirty-nine States, nineteen have retention elections (in seven, for all judges).
Contestable elections occur in thirty-three States: twenty have nonpartisan elections (in twelve, for all judges),
and sixteen have partisan elections (in seven, for all judges); three of those States have both nonpartisan and par-
tisan elections (Idaho, Indiana and North Carolina).
Second, the right the Due Process Clause provides litigants to unbiased, impartial, open-minded judges, both as a matter
of fact and as a matter of perception, must be carefully weighed along with the First Amendment rights presented in this
case. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1059
(Summer 1996). While some lower courts have referred to impartiality as a compelling state interest, few explicitly re-
cognize the constitutional dimension of the interest embodied within the Due Process Clause, and most simply ignore it.
2002 WL 257559 (U.S.) Page 8
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Petitioners and some amici acknowledge the constitutional nature of the state interest but suggest that the Due Process
Clause is violated only when a judge should have stepped aside, but did not, in a specific case based on particular state-
ments made during a campaign. This suggestion, however, is underinclusive as some judicial speech may violate the
State's interest in an impartial judiciary even if it does not violate a particular litigant's due process rights. In contrast, the
States should be permitted to focus on preventing disqualification problems in the first instance. The Conference urges
that this Court focus on the perspective of the States in structuring their judicial systems in deciding the case.
Third, the issue in this case presents squarely the role of judicial independence within state constitutional provisions for
the separation of governmental powers as well as checks and balances. Only an independent judiciary, unencumbered by
commitments to popular majorities, is able to discharge its historic constitutional obligations, including review of legis-
lative actions produced by those same majorities. As this Court has recognized the “fundamental tension” between the re-
quirements of an independent judiciary and the demands of electoral politics, see Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400
(1991), so have the States acknowledged this tension and the differences between the work of legislators and the work of
judges that underlies it. By enacting reasonable limits on judicial campaign conduct and speech, States have sought to
strike a balance among the different constitutional pressures at work within a judicial elective process. The need for such
limits has become increasingly evident under the “realities” of modern judicial campaigns,[FN4] as judicial candidates
come under pressure to win office with commitments, express or clearly implied, on the controversial political and legal
issues of the day.
FN4. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 477 (2001); An-
thony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 77 Ind. L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (presented at Novem-
ber 2001 Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment); Thomas R. Phillips, Comment
on Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 130 (Summer 1998).
ARGUMENT
I. THE STATES HAVE HISTORICALLY IMPLEMENTED A VARIETY OF MEASURES TO PROVIDE FOR JUDI-
CIAL ELECTIONS WHILE PRESERVING THE DISTINCTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY.
This Court has recognized “a fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of
electoral politics,” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991), and the States, while choosing to hold judicial elections,
have been mindful of that tension. They have striven consistently and with care to balance judicial accountability with ju-
dicial independence and impartiality. The Conference urges this Court to bear in mind the impact its decision will have
on the States' historic efforts to handle the unique challenges state judicial elections present.
Between 1846 and 1860, twenty-one States had constitutional conventions, nineteen of which chose elections, with only
Massachusetts and New Hampshire holding out.[FN5] It is not correct that the choice of elections was “an unthinking
‘emotional response’ rooted in … Jacksonian Democracy” which somehow “assumed that popular election of judges
constituted a radical measure intended to break judicial power through an infusion of popular will and majority control.”
Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional *6 Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860,
44 Historian 337, 338-39 (1983). On the contrary, the move to judicial elections was led by moderate lawyer-delegates to
increase judicial independence and stature. Their goal was a judiciary “free from the corrosive effects of politics and able
to restrain legislative power.” Id.
FN5. By 1860, twenty-one of our thirty States elected judges. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State
Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 44 Historian 337 (1983) for a discussion
of the history of judicial elections. See also Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanation for the Rise
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of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 191 (1993).
Moderate reformers built consensus among delegates by adopting constitutional devices designed to limit the potentially
disruptive consequences of popular election. Id. at 342, 352. For example, provisions rendering judges ineligible to run
for other offices while serving on the bench were intended to prevent the political use of judicial office to win other of-
fices. Staggered terms for appellate judges were aimed at averting sweeping changes in the composition of the courts res-
ulting from increased “party feeling” in a particular election. These measures and others, such as longer terms and
“retention” elections, served the goal of restricting the “impact of party and majority rule.” Id. at 352.
The constitutions of the thirty-nine States in which judges face elections of some type have an array of such provisions,
unique to the judiciary, to accommodate the choice of popular selection with the constitutional value of judicial inde-
pendence. See, e.g., P. App. 37a n. 18. Most would be unthinkable for other elected officials in the legislative and execut-
ive branches. In all thirty-nine States (except Nebraska), judges' terms are longer than any other elective officials'.[FN6]
In thirty-*7 seven of these States, only judges are subject to both impeachment and special disciplinary process.[FN7] In
thirty-three, judges are the only elective state officials subject to requirements of training and/or experience (except that
in ten of those, the attorney general is subject to similar requirements).[FN8] In twenty-three, only judges are subject to
mandatory age retirement.[FN9] In twenty-one, only judicial nominations go through nominating commissions; in six
States, this applies even to interim appointments.[FN10] Last, in eighteen States, only judges cannot run for a nonjudicial
office without first resigning.[FN11]
FN6. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 4; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 16; Ga. Const. art. 6, § 7 ¶ I; Ill. Const. art. 6, § 10;
Mich. Const. art. VI, § 2; Minn. Const. art. 6, § 7; N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 2; Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6; Tex. Const.
art. 5, § 2. Here and in notes 6-10, all citations are to constitutional provisions; no statutory provisions are in-
cluded.
Of appellate judges who face elections, 38.5% have terms of ten to fifteen years and another 60.6% have six to
eight year terms. Of trial judges who face elections, 13% have terms of ten to fifteen years, and another 67.6%
have six to eight year terms. Citizens for Independent Courts, Uncertain Justice: Report of the Citizens for Inde-
pendent Courts Task Force on Selecting State Court Judges 77, 90-92, 116-17 (2000).
FN7. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6.1, § 3; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 18(d); Ga. Const. art. 6, § 7 ¶ VI; Ill. Const. art. 6, §
15(b); Mich. Const. art. VI, § 30; Minn. Const. art. 6, § 9; N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 22; Ohio Const. art. VI, § 17;
Tex. Const. art. 5, § 1-a.
FN8. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 6; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 15; Ga. Const. art. 6, § 7 ¶ II; Ill. Const. art. 6, § 11;
Minn. Const. art. 6, § 5; N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 20; Tex. Const. art. 5, § 2.
FN9. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 39; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 20; Ill. Const. art. 6, § 15(a); N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 25;
Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6(c); Tex. Const. art. 5, § 1-a(1).
FN10. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 37; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 7; Ky. Const. art. III, § 118(2) (with interim appoint-
ments included); N.M. Const. art. VI, § 35 (with interim appointments included); N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 2(c).
FN11. E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 28; Cal. Const. art. 6, § 17; Ill. Const. art. 6, § 13(b); Mich. Const. art. VI, §
21; Minn. Const. art. 6, § 6; N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 20(b)(1); Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6(b).
This pattern shows that the choice of elections, “while perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom, does not signify the
abandonment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying out its duties fairly and thoroughly.” Stretton v. Disciplinary
2002 WL 257559 (U.S.) Page 10
© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991). The thirty-nine States have recognized that, far from fulfilling the historic purpose
in allowing for the popular election of *8 judges, any effort to treat judicial elections like others wholly undermines the
judiciaries' independent role under their constitutions. Their balanced approach to the proper structure for an elected judi-
ciary embodies the understanding that
the word “representative” connotes one who is not only elected by the people, but who also, at a minimum, acts on behalf
of the people. Judges do that in a sense-but not in the ordinary sense.… [T]he judge represents the Law-which often re-
quires him to rule against the People.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Contrary to the suggestion of one petitioner and one of the amici, see Pet'r Republican Party of Minnesota Br. at 38-39;
Idaho Conservation League and Louisiana Environmental Action Network Br. at 7-23, this case does not present the
Court with a choice between forcing States to conduct judicial elections like all other elections, and prohibiting judicial
elections altogether. The voters in these States have generally rejected efforts to dismantle judicial elections, choosing to
maintain in place judicial election processes which have historically included safeguards to protect the traditional role of
the judiciary.[FN12] There is no support for the proposition that the electorate has viewed the choice as one between le-
gislative-type elections or no elections at all. Any *9 suggestion to the contrary assumes, improbably, that voters, by
choosing elections, have chosen also to have a judiciary transformed radically in character. For these reasons, States will
continue to conduct elections while continuing also to grapple with the challenges those elections present for an inde-
pendent and impartial judiciary.
FN12. In 1906, when Roscoe Pound gave a landmark address to the ABA, roughly fourteen percent of our state
judges faced no elections. Roy A. Schotland, Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Personal Views, 34 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1361, 1367 (2001). Today that number stands at thirteen percent. Id. A failed attempt to abandon
the elective system in Florida exemplifies its resiliency. In 2000, for example, Florida voters faced a ballot pro-
position to decide whether their trial judges should continue to run in nonpartisan, contestable elections, or
should instead be subject to merit appointments with subsequent retention elections. The change was defeated in
every circuit and in every county. Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections 2000: Change & Challenge,
2001 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 1, 37-41 (forthcoming).
II. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES JUDGES WHO WILL “HOLD THE BALANCE NICE, CLEAR AND TRUE.”[FN13]
FN13. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
Petitioners agree with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that “a judge's ability to apply the law neutrally is a compelling
governmental interest of the highest order.” Pet'r Republican Party of Minnesota Br. at 4 (citing P. App. 21a). They ac-
knowledge “the due process clause of the United States Constitution sets the floor.” Id. at 18. “Due process,” they admit,
“requires trial before an unbiased judge.” Id. (citation omitted). The Conference concurs.
Petitioners and some of their amici suggest, however, that the due process analysis should only be considered on a case-
by-case basis, involving the standards and process of disqualification. Id. at 19-21; American Civil Liberties Union Br. at
16-18; Public Citizen Br. at 6-7. Yet, if a judge steps down from any case involving a campaign promise, the voters do
not get what they believe they were promised. Petitioners' retrospective approach further imposes on litigants burdens
and risks, and imposes on the judicial system both avoidable litigation and the potential loss of many judges' services. In
contrast, States with judicial elections sensibly choose to structure those elections to protect guarantees under the Due
Process Clause for all litigants rather than subjecting litigants to the burdens and inefficiencies of post-election disquali-
fication*10 or recusal[FN14] procedures. In short, disqualification is inadequate because it does not protect the State's in-
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terest in an impartial judiciary, an interest that parallels but is separate from the interests of particular litigants.
FN14. While traditionally “disqualification” was involuntary and “recusal” voluntary, in modern practice the
terms “are frequently viewed as synonymous and often used interchangeably.” Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Dis-
qualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, § 1.1, at 4-5 (Little, Brown & Co. 1996).
At stake in this case is how much flexibility the States and their supreme courts (judges regulating other judges) will
have in regulating their own judges. This Court has recognized that there “could hardly be a higher governmental interest
than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary.” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848
(1978). The Due Process Clause's guarantee of impartial judges, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of perception, is
a compelling state interest. The dissent in the Eighth Circuit (and other lower courts and some amici) overlooked the due
process rights to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal as a compelling state interest. P. App. 92a-93a (“must give way
before rights which, unlike the court's policy, have been constitutionally secured”) (emphasis added).
A. States Must Have Latitude to Address the Serious Due Process Issues Presented by Judicial Candidate Speech, and
Cannot Rely on Disqualification Procedures Alone.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that judicial bias, or even the appearance of bias, violates the Due Process Clause.
Concrete Pipe & Products v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“due process requires a ‘neutral
and detached judge in the first instance’ ” (citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972)); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986) (Due Process Clause *11 violated when judge had “direct, personal, sub-
stantial, pecuniary” interest in outcome); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ( “no person will be de-
prived of his interest in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is
not predisposed to find against him”); Ward, 409 U.S. at 59-60 (Due Process Clause offended when system tempts
“average man as a judge … not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927))); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (“Trial before an ‘unbiased judge’ is essential to due process”
(citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205 (1968); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971))); In re Murch-
ison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. … [O]ur system has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness … [even though this may] sometimes bar trial judges
who have no actual bias, and who would do their very best to weigh the scale of justice between contending parties.”);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (“justice must satisfy the appearance of justice”); Tumey, 237 U.S. at 523
(it “violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his
liberty or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in
reaching a conclusion against him in this case”).
This Court has made clear that the contours of the Due Process Clause in this context “cannot be defined with precision,”
and that a “reasonable formulation of the issue is whether the ‘situation is one which would offer a possible temptation
… to the average … judge to … lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.’ ” Aetna, 475 U.S. at 825 (citing
Ward, 409 U.S. at 60). Because the judicial interest “cannot be defined with precision,” id., this Court should give latit-
ude to the States and their supreme courts who are attempting to structure court systems to effectively *12 address the
questions of impartiality that imperil the rights of litigants under the Due Process Clause.[FN15]
FN15. For example, since 1995 Ohio has taken official steps to promote constructive judicial campaigns and re-
duce the likelihood of problematic conduct. See Richard A. Dove, Judicial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Educa-
tion, and Enforcement, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1447, 1456-57, 1460-61, 1463-64 (2001). All judicial candidates
must attend a special course early in the campaign year, and special panels of judges and an expedited hearing
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process are in place to deal with problematic conduct if it occurs. See Id.
While due process is a necessary part of a fair and impartial trial, “it is not a right that lends itself to a fixed or immutable
definition.” Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges, § 2.3.2, at 33 & n.13
(Little, Brown & Co. 1996). “Though impartial judges are constitutionally mandated and the due process clause sets a
standard for judicial impartiality below which no judge is constitutionally permitted to fall, judicial disqualifications are
rarely made on due process grounds.” Id. § 2.3.3, at 33-34 & n. 17 (citing, inter alia, Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820). States may,
of course, impose more rigorous judicial disqualification standards than due process requires. Id. at 34 & n.19 (citing,
inter alia, Aetna, 475 U.S. at 828; FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523). Such efforts
are “to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 36 & n.19 (citing, inter alia, Liljeberg v.
Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)). The public confidence in the impartiality of judges has con-
stitutional dimensions, Id. at 36 n. 34 (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 865 n.12), not addressed by Petitioners.
Disqualification procedures are insufficient. See Shepard, supra, at 1082. Recusal does not help the litigant who is un-
aware of the judge's statements, and often the litigant bears the expensive and time-consuming burden of raising and lit-
igating the question of recusal. Recusal also imposes costs *13 and delays on the public and other litigants as cases are
shuffled from court to court. Moreover, recusal does not serve the voters who elected a judge based on her stated views.
Finally, a reliance on recusal would permit a judicial candidate to offer up whatever view seemed to get the most votes or
the most contributions, with full knowledge that the candidate would never have to stand by it as a judge. Impartiality is
thus secured only by a form of electoral fraud, which could entail also ethical violations for deliberate misrepresentations
in the course of a campaign.
Courts facing disqualification issues presented in this context are generally reluctant to probe into election-related influ-
ence or motivation. See, e.g., Nevius v. Warden, 960 P.2d 805, 810 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting) (“Judges
should be judging crime, not ‘fighting’ crime”); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 321-22 (Mo. 1996) (not willing to dis-
qualify a trial court judge who six days before presiding over a capital trial of a black defendant, and who faced election
later that year, issued a press release announcing a decision to switch political parties claiming that his prior party had
“place[d] far too much emphasis on … people with a skin that's any color but white” and he expressed opposition to
“reverse-discrimination quotas and affirmative action”). Precisely to avoid such situations, States have been unwilling to
rely on disqualification to address the impact of campaign activity on due process guarantees.
B. Judicial Candidate Speech on Political or Legal Issues Likely to Come Before Courts Carries a High Risk of Improper
Prejudgments or Commitments, Whether Express or Implied, in Violation of Due Process Guarantees.
When a judicial candidate speaks out on disputed legal or political issues that may come before him, the electorate reas-
onably uses those statements to form expectations about the treatment of issues likely to come before that judge. *14
There is, in fact, no other reason why a judicial candidate would offer such statements in the course of the campaign, nor
any other use that voters would make of them. Numerous amici acknowledge this point. See, e.g., Amici Curiae [Two]
State Supreme Court Justices Br. at 23-24; Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States Br. at 5-7. As a
result, campaign statements about the candidate's views on issues likely to come before the court leave litigants facing a
judge who, at worst, is actually biased or who, at best, cannot provide the appearance of impartial justice. Judicial canons
limiting campaign conduct attempt to limit the circumstances in which a due process problem of this magnitude could
result.
Rejecting a First Amendment challenge to such a Canon, the Third Circuit stated:
If judicial candidates during a campaign prejudge cases that later come before them, the concept of impartial justice be-
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comes a mockery. The ideal of an adjudication reached after a fair hearing, giving due consideration to the evidence pro-
duced by all parties no longer would apply and the confidence of the public in the rule of law would be undermined.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142.
Even if candidates argue-much less believe in good faith-that they can wipe the slate clean of campaign promises to de-
cide a case, “the requirement of due process … is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the
greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.” Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. Due process guarantees
more than a possibility that a judge would back down from his public statements if convinced to do so. In the current cli-
mate of judicial elections, there is a strong influence on a judge to stand by campaign statements on which he staked his
hopes of victory- and behind which he would have to stand in seeking reelection. Under the worst *15 circumstances,
such a campaign “promise” is like “a bribe offered to voters, paid with rulings consistent with that promise, in return for
continued employment as a judge.” Shepard, supra, at 1088.
Canons limiting judicial candidate campaign conduct are “straightforward” regulations of expression that do not discrim-
inate in favor of one viewpoint or another. They do not suppress ideas or seek to control political opinions. See United
States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).
A hypothetical campaign promise made in the most literal sense, such as “I will impose the maximum sentence in every
drunk driving case,” commits the candidate to a result regardless of the applicable laws or the facts presented. The canon
protects accused drunk drivers from a predisposed judge, who cannot, by virtue of a campaign promise, fulfill the duty to
consider all the relevant sentencing factors, including, for example, the accused's prior record, property damage or per-
sonal injury, and the proven blood alcohol level. A judge's failure to consider these factors could warrant reversal and
would certainly violate the defendant's due process rights. Shepard, supra, at 1093; see also Robert M. O'Neil, The Can-
ons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 77 Ind. L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (presented at November 2001 Sym-
posium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment).
Courts reviewing the efforts of States to limit judicial campaign activity have historically been sensitive to First Amend-
ment rights affected by these limitations. For example, the district court, the Eighth Circuit, and now the Minnesota Su-
preme Court have construed the announce clause before this Court to apply only to statements displaying a pre-
disposition on issues likely to come before the elected judge. See, e.g., P. App. 52a-53a; 128a. The Conference urges this
Court to respect the difficult but *16 essential balance that States have labored to achieve and that lower courts have, by
and large, approved, in some instances with the aid of narrowing constructions. P. App. 53a-56a.
Judicial canons limiting statements by judicial candidates that indicate or suggest bias, if applied with proper, limiting
construction, lead to the right result: they protect the due process rights of litigants by preventing judicial candidates
from acquiring an improper interest in the outcome of litigation, and by preventing the appearance of such an interest.
The prevention of actual and apparent judicial bias, recognized by the Eighth Circuit here and by other circuits in
Stretton and Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993), is the same interest that this Court has
protected under the Due Process Clause. The right to an impartial judge, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, is a com-
pelling governmental interest. The best approach to resolving challenges to canons regulating judicial campaigns is to ac-
commodate as much speech by judicial candidates as the Due Process Clause permits, viewed from the context of States',
and their supreme courts', attempts to structure their judicial systems to avoid these difficulties. Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“this is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie
on both sides of the legal equation.”).
III. THIS CASE RAISES ISSUES CENTRAL TO STATE EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE AND DIS-
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TINCT ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEMES OF SEPARATED POWERS.
A. The “Basic Principle” of Separated Powers Compels Close Attention to the Effect of Elections on Judicial Independ-
ence.
Petitioner Minnesota Republican Party argues that “this case is not about judicial independence.” Pet'r Minnesota Repub-
lican Party Br. at 8. Moreover, neither Petitioners nor *17 any amici even refer to state constitutional frameworks of sep-
arated powers which depend in substantial measure on the protection of that independence. The Conference respectfully
suggests, however, that the question before this Court involves in the most fundamental way these profound constitution-
al concerns.
Certainly the court below correctly appreciated the States' understanding that limitations on judicial campaign conduct
and speech, taken together with other constitutional and statutory procedures for the conduct of judicial elections, “are
designed in large part to protect the independence of the State's judiciary.” See P. App. 25a. Attending closely to the re-
quirements of judicial independence, the States have properly kept in view the “basic principle” of separation of powers
which compels “allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task.” Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996).
The separation of powers doctrine requires, in practical application, “an analysis of governmental functions,” W.B.
Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers 26 (1965), and sensitivity to the maintenance of the checks and bal-
ances necessary to protect each branch of the government from “encroachment and aggrandizement” by another. Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989). No principle has more centrally shaped organization of state govern-
ments and in particular the relationships between and among their branches. Rooted in pre-Revolutionary political
thought that cast the mold for the federal and state constitutions to follow, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution 74 (1967), the doctrine of separated powers for the judicial, executive and legislative branches
came quickly to define for States “the very characteristic of the American political system.” Gordon S. Wood, The Cre-
ation of the *18 American Republic 1776-1787 151 (1969). State constitutions throughout the country, like Minnesota's,
reflect the centrality of this commitment.[FN16]
FN16. Thus Article 3, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution states that “[T]he powers of government shall be
divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others
except in the instances expressly provided in this constitution.” Minn. Const. art. 3, § 1 (2000).
In choosing judicial elections, States have not abandoned their concern with preserving fully separated powers. The
States know that if candidates for judicial office appeal for voters' support on the same basis as legislative candidates-if
they answer to the same electoral majorities-the courts run the grave risk of becoming second legislatures. As electoral
twins to the legislatures, courts would stand to lose the essential independence required for them to discharge their high
constitutional duty of judicial review. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803). For this reason, States in the early Republic acted to establish that independence, expecting that the ju-
diciary could only then provide the necessary “check” on legislative excess fueled by popular passion. See Wood, supra,
at 404, 451.[FN17] Since that time, States-including States with judicial elections-have remained vigilant in protecting
that independence, adopting a variety of measures to secure it. See supra Part I.
FN17. James Madison illustrated the general principle a different way, by opposing a proposal that would have
facilitated the conduct of constitutional conventions as a means of checking governmental abuse. Madison ob-
jected that the proposal would have conferred an undue advantage on the legislature, whose members, skilled in
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the electoral arts, would have the advantage in seeking election to the constitutions. Because “the same influence
which had gained them an election into the legislature would gain them a seat in the convention,” the convention
could not effectively act as a check on legislative excess. The Federalist No. 49, at 316 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed.).
*19 Judicial review, unburdened by undue popular pressures, is necessary to assure that a majority “united by a common
interest” does not threaten the rights of the minority. The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed.). This Court has recognized, for example, the role of “searching judicial inquiry” where legislation reflects “prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities … which tends seriously to curtail the operation of the political processes ordinar-
ily to be relied upon to protect minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). This is val-
ued even when popular majorities effect their will directly by referendum or initiative. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993) (Constitutional amendment impermissibly “fenced out” from participation in the political
process “an independently identifiable group.”), aff'd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
These same concerns apply beyond constitutional judicial review, to routine review of agency action. “Policy argu-
ments,” as this Court has made clear, “are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.” Chev-
ron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1983). Chevron principles hold true for state courts. State
courts, like federal courts, must proceed in reviewing agency action with the understanding that “[j]udges are not experts
in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government,” and that the resolution of the issues before
them must not depend on “their personal policy preferences.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864. Because judicial candidates, like
other candidates, come under pressure to place personal “preferences” front and center before the voters, States impose
limits on judicial candidate speech to defend the boundaries of judicial decision-making.
Some amici before this Court, stressing the policy-making role of state courts in common law adjudications, see, e.g.,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 466 (1952), contend that judges must be free in this circumstance to abandon the *20
chambers for the hustings, or to rule from the bench with a close eye on the voter. See Amici Curiae [Two] State Su-
preme Court Justices Br. at 4 (A state's adoption of an elective system “suggests that a certain degree of political re-
sponsiveness [by elected judges] is not only permissible, but is an intrinsic and expected element of the elective judicial
role.”). This suggestion is profoundly mistaken. The courts do not engage in common law adjudication as surrogates for
the legislature. Legislators attend closely to the will of voters on election day, and to the direct imprecation of interest
groups and constituents at all other times. Judges decide the cases before them by presiding over a distinctive adversarial
process and making a disciplined use of the tools of their craft to decide impartially based upon the evidence and the ap-
plicable law.
The States have sought to protect the judiciary in the performance of its independent function through various constitu-
tional provisions, statutes and rules. See supra Part I. The Supreme Court of Minnesota has carefully considered the ef-
forts of that State, concluding that “[w]hile the framers of our state constitution have developed a system of selection and
election quite different from that federal scheme, they, too, designed a plan to recognize the uniqueness and independ-
ence of the state judiciary.” Peterson v. Stafford, 490 N.W.2d 418, 420 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1033 (1993),
quoted in P. App. 108a. The design of Minnesota's plan necessarily involved complex choices that the States and the fed-
eral government have always faced in preserving the judicial independence within constitutional arrangements of separ-
ated powers. See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, Separating Power 152 (1997). Yet in Minnesota and elsewhere, there is broad
agreement-even among jurists who favor an elective process-that to protect judicial independence, states need “clear and
reasonable rules for judicial campaign behavior.” See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 973, 1003 (2001).
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*21 B. Courts Have Long Recognized the Tension between Independence and Electoral Accountability in Seeking to
Preserve the Distinctive Role of the Judiciary.
1. The Precedents Acknowledge the Unique Issues Elective Systems Present For the Judiciary.
This Court has noted the “fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real world of
electoral politics.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400. The lower courts, while disagreeing on outcomes, have concurred on the
challenge presented by that “fundamental tension.” They have agreed in particular about the source of the problem: that
the role of the judge is fundamentally different from that of the legislator, and that this fundamental difference shapes the
issues raised by their respective candidacies for elective office. This Court has summarily affirmed, for example, a lower
court ruling that the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution does not mandate the application of the “one man, one
vote” apportionment doctrine to judicial elections. The lower court in that case specifically concluded that:
[T]he one man-one vote doctrine, applicable as it now is to selection of legislative and executive officials, does not ex-
tend to the judiciary. Manifestly, judges and prosecutors are not representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the
executive. Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency.
Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972) (citing Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga.
1964)), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
Other lower courts have unanimously adopted this understanding of the core differences between legislators and judges.
See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228 (“Judges remain different from legislators and executive officials, even when *22 all are
elected, in ways that bear on the strength of the state's interest in restricting their freedom of speech.”); Stretton, 944 F.2d
at 142; Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977).
Indeed, the differences acknowledged by the courts between the work of legislators and that of judges are vast, bearing
directly on the fundamental differences in the “political” responsiveness appropriately expected from them by their
“voters” and “constituents.” Elected legislators are free to meet-at any time, openly or privately-with their constituents or
others affected by their action in pending or future matters who enjoy a guaranteed constitutional right of petition. In
contrast, judges are insulated from contact with the parties to a matter before them by both norms and legal restrictions
on ex parte contacts.[FN18] Unlike legislators, judges cannot build support through constituent casework, patronage or
securing benefits for their communities. Other elected officials expect and typically face competition, but few judges
do.[FN19] While elected legislators may and do pledge to change law and, if elected, often work reservedly toward
change, judges may not. Judges, to the contrary, are expected to approach with restraint issues of great societal or politic-
al *23 import; to this end they employ “devices for disposing of a case while avoiding judgment on the constitutional is-
sues it raises,” which include the doctrines of standing, vagueness and ripeness. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dan-
gerous Branch 17, 117-18, 143, 150, 169 (Bobbs-Merrill 1957).[FN20]
FN18. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann., Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon (3)(A)(7) (2001); see also McKenzie v.
State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 1998) (“[c]learly a judge may not discuss a trial with one party unless the
opposing party is present”).
FN19. See, e.g., Chief Justice Thomas R. Phillips, Address to the Joint Session of the 73d Legislature of Texas 5
(Feb. 23, 1993) (“[O]ver eighty percent [of Texas's 481 judges sitting in 1993] were unopposed in both the
primary and general election when they first sought reelection. … [O]f those … who initially reached the bench
by appointment … fifty-five percent have never had an opponent … either in a primary or a general election.”);
see also Melinda Gann Hall, Competition in Judicial Elections, 1980-1995 table 2 at 20 (Sept. 1998)
(unpublished paper delivered at 1998 American Political Science Association annual meeting) (stating that
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forty-eight percent of incumbent justices are not challenged).
FN20. Blackstone's comments on equity-the correction of deficiencies in the law-explain the philosophical un-
derpinnings of the idea:
[T]he liberty of considering all cases in an equitable light must not be indulged too far, least thereby we destroy
all law, and leave the decision of every question entirely in the breast of the judge. … [E]quity without law …
would make every judge a legislator, and introduce most infinite confusion.
George Sharswood, ed., Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 60 (Childs & Peterson 1860).
The politics of the legislative elective process turns on commitments, unfettered dialogue and responsiveness, and it does
not end with election, but continues beyond, in the day-to-day conduct of legislative office. The politician who won the
election is a politician still afterward, free to cultivate and reward support by working with his supporters to advance
shared objectives. And because elected officials act in ways that may directly affect large numbers of people, those af-
fected may, in turn, resort to political safeguards. See Minn. State Bd. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283-87 (1984). But a
judge, once elected, must behave as a judge-acting, as an arbiter, neutrally toward the identifiable and limited number of
parties in each case. Those parties, typically the only ones affected by the judge's actions, have no safeguard except the
judge's commitment to taking action only on the facts and the law.
It is in light of these differences that the role of the judge-as-political-candidate presents challenges for both the candid-
ate and the State seeking to preserve the essential attributes of the judiciary. Petitioner Minnesota Republican Party con-
cedes that, as the Eighth Circuit below stated the case, “it is consistent with the essential nature of campaigns for *24 le-
gislative and executive offices for candidates to detail and make promises about the programs that they intend to enact
into law and to administer.” Pet'r Minnesota Republican Party Br. at 34 (citing P. App. 44a).
As a result, the conscientious judge has no choice but to take care with campaign speech, being wary of even implying
promises or commitments. Failure to do so would visit, in effect, either a fraud on the voters or a fraud on the office. The
successful candidate, recognizing that a commitment has been made or perceived, cannot act on it without violating the
obligation to rule without prejudice or commitment. Alternatively, the candidate may disregard the commitment, or the
perception of it, leading the voters to conclude that they have been deceived.
States have responded to this dilemma with carefully drawn limitations on speech, but also with other measures intended
to mitigate the effects of campaigning on judicial independence. All but four States with judicial elections bar personal
fundraising and require that all fundraising be done by the candidate's campaign committee, in order to at least reduce the
candidate's involvement in fundraising.[FN21] At least twenty-four States limit the time period during which fundraising
is permitted, both before and after the election.[FN22] ABA Task Force Report, supra, at pt. 2, 47-48.
FN21. The four states are California, Texas, Idaho and Nevada. See ABA Task Force Report, supra, at 40-41
n.73.
FN22. The pre-election window is one year in five states and shorter in eleven states, and the post-election win-
dow is six months or shorter in nineteen states. Id. at 48 n.2.
Recognizing the fundamental differences between judges and other officials that lie behind state limits on judicial can-
didate speech and conduct, the courts have grappled with the formulation of the appropriate constitutional standard. The
court below adopted a narrowly tailored/compelling interest *25 test. See P. App. 20a. Other courts, following this
Court's analysis of Hatch Act prohibitions on public employees, see Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, have adopted versions
of the less stringent test articulated in that case. See, e.g., Stretton, 944 F.2d at 141 (construing the balance called for in
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Letter Carriers to require narrow tailoring to a compelling interest); Morial, 565 F.2d at 300 (interpreting Letter Carriers
to require a “reasonable necessity … to achieve a compelling public objective”); see also Buckley, 997 F.2d at 227-30
(stating no rule, but balancing the interests of the State and the candidates and examining the rule's fit to the State's in-
terest).[FN23] Still another line of authority suggests that a lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate when the speech in
question implicates the fair administration of justice. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1057 (1991); see also Neb.
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“As officers of the court, court personnel
and attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate that will … obstruct the fair administration of
justice.”); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges are restrained in their
freedom of expression by historic compulsions resting on no other officials of government. They are so circumscribed
precisely because judges have in their keeping the enforcement of rights and the protection of liberties which, according
to the wisdom of the ages, can only be enforced and protected by observing such methods and traditions.”).
FN23. Subsequent cases have interpreted Letter Carriers in differing ways. Some, including Snepp v. United
States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n. 3 (1980), and Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980), suggest that the appropri-
ate test is one requiring the restriction to be a reasonable means to protect a substantial state interest.
The courts employing various constitutional tests are doing so, however, on the basis of a common conviction-that the ju-
diciary's role is distinctive, and that it calls for special *26 protections when judges become candidates for elective of-
fice. They agree also that reconciling electoral accountability with the judiciary's unique function, while a difficult task,
is essential. See, e.g., Buckley, 997 F.2d at 227 (“only a fanatic would suppose that one of the principles should give way
completely to the other”); Morial, 565 F.2d at 300 n.5 (noting that First Amendment candidacy jurisprudence is
“difficult”); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1099 (N.D. Fla. 1990). At stake is the quality and principled ad-
ministration of justice by state courts whose members, though required to stand for election, would remain faithful still to
what this Court has termed “the ideal character of the judicial office.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400.
2. Any Standard for Judging Permissible Candidate Speech Must Take into Account the “Political Realities” of Modern
Campaigns.
In at least a few States, judicial elections in recent years have come increasingly to resemble legislative and executive
contests in cost, intensity and style. See ABA Task Force Report, supra, at 13 n.25 (“The changes in judicial elections
have been summed up as making them ‘nastier, noisier and costlier.’ ” (citing Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice for
Sale?: The State's Top Judge Resigns to Fight for Reform, Time, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74)); see also R. Darcy, Conflict and
Reform: Oklahoma Judicial Elections 1907-1998, 26 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 519, 519 (Summer 2001). Any rule or stand-
ard fashioned to distinguish permissible from impermissible candidate campaign speech needs to take into account
“political realities” in this sphere, as this Court has counseled in other cases involving campaign speech and activity. See,
e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 477 (2001).
It is error to believe that campaign speech, like other speech, depends for its effectiveness on “spelling out” the inten-
tions of the speaker. Much to the contrary, political tactics often favor *27 the concise, coded expressions that stop con-
siderably short of full exposition. See, e.g., Kathleen Hall Jameson, Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction and Demo-
cracy 85 (1992) (noting common use of “code words, images, voices, or tones” used to “telegraph” a message). Political
speech is frequently, and quite deliberately, suggestive rather than explicit, often cast into abbreviated “soundbite” form;
and “a more sophisticated mixture of candidate-centered advocacy peppered with ambiguous issue references has long
proved the most effective advertising strategy.” David A. Pepper, Recasting the Issue Ad: The Failure of the Court's Is-
sue Advocacy Standards, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. 141, 158 (1997).
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One cause for the continued controversy over the announce clause is that while the constitutional issues are apparent, so
are the means by which such “announcements” on “general issues” provide, in the medium of political speech, ample
room for the communication of commitments. It matters less how many words are used, and how precisely, and more
what is intended by the speaker and fully understood by the audience. This attention to intention and to context may not
pass muster with courts in cases involving legislative campaign finance, see, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Christian Ac-
tion Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 957-58 (W.D. Va. 1995), aff'd, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19047 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1996),
but it is vital in understanding the challenges of judicial campaigning for an independent, impartial judiciary.
As the Court resolves the issue presented in this case, it is urged to do so with careful attention to the difficulties presen-
ted by candidate campaign speech-even on “issues”-for an independent and impartial judiciary. In their efforts to address
this problem, the States are addressing a real and urgent one of *28 separating out informative speech from the kind, no
less typical of campaigns, intended to communicate commitments.[FN24]
FN24. It is not correct that attempts to limit commitments are necessarily frustrated-or rendered fatally incon-
sistent-by the right of “judges or prospective judges” to take positions in “judicial opinions, legal briefs or argu-
ments, law review articles, op-ed pieces, books, or speeches that predate the declaration of candidacy.” Public
Citizen Br. at 13. There is little danger that legal scholarship will be confused with campaign statements, that the
two will have similar effects on potential voters, or even that the audience for the one is the same as for the oth-
er.
3. The Court's Increased Role in the Adjudication of Prominent Issues Also Before the Legislature and Executive Justi-
fies Clear and Reasonable Regulations of Judicial Campaign Speech.
The issue before this Court arises at a time in the country's history when state and federal courts consider the widest
range of controversial issues in American politics and society. See, e.g., Morial, 565 F.2d at 302 (“Ours is an era in
which members of the judiciary often are called upon to adjudicate cases squarely presenting hotly contested social or
political issues.”); Buckley, 997 F.2d at 229 (“There is almost no legal or political issue that is unlikely to come before a
judge of an American court, state or federal, of general jurisdiction.”). These same issues-reproductive rights, gun con-
trol, the regulation of tobacco, affirmative action, and others-also occupy center-stage in the political process and in the
legislatures. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 98 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting a claim that the Alaska Constitution im-
plies a right to physician-assisted suicide); Hilly v. Portland, 582 A.2d 1213, 1215 (Me. 1990) (reviewing the constitu-
tionality of a statute requiring a permit for the carrying of a concealed weapon); Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d
645, 649 (Miss. 1998) (reviewing a claim that certain statutory restrictions on abortion are unconstitutional); *29 Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 2000) (asserting that the Vermont Constitution mandates extension of state marriage
laws to same-sex couples).
An elected court in particular must avoid the perception or the possibility that its members, having campaigned on such
issues, may be pressed to act more like elected legislators than judges in resolving them. Here the danger is not, as previ-
ously discussed, that courts will be unable to check the legislature, but that they will be unable, under the pressures of the
campaign trail, to check themselves, and will intrude into the prerogatives and methods of the other branches.
This check can be accomplished only by judges who review and decide their cases as judges-by using the tools of their
craft. Those include an unrelenting focus on the facts and the law, and the conduct of careful legal analysis presented
clearly and with integrity in opinions and orders. Justice Cardozo, who was elected with party endorsement to judicial of-
fice in New York, expressed the nature of the judicial function in these terms:
[A]n important distinction separates … judicial from legislative activity. … [T]he judge … ought, in adherence to the
spirit of our modern organization, and in order to escape the dangers of arbitrary action, to disengage himself, so far as
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possible, of every influence that is personal or that comes from the particular situation which is presented to him, and
base his judicial decision on elements of an objective nature.
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 120-121 (1921).
Full engagement with the electorate as a political candidate necessarily places severe strains on fidelity to these prin-
ciples. Yet these are the core principles which define-and limit-the participation of judges in the controversial issues of
the day.
*30 CONCLUSION
Amicus curiae, Conference of Chief Justices, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Eighth Cir-
cuit insofar as it acknowledges the constitutional basis for allowing States, when considering limits on judicial candidate
speech, to balance First Amendment concerns against the guarantees of the Due Process Clause and the role of an inde-
pendent judiciary under our constitutional scheme of separated powers.
APPENDIX
*1a STATES AND THE TYPES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS FOR SOME OR ALL OF THEIR JUDGES (Underlined
states have different judges facing different types of elections.)
PARTISAN[FN*] RETENTION[FN**] NON-PARTISAN NO JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS[FN***]
Alabama Alaska Arkansas Connecticut
Idaho Arizona Arizona Delaware
Illinois California California Hawaii
Indiana Colorado Florida Massachusetts
Kansas Florida Georgia Maine
Louisiana Illinois Idaho New Hampshire
Michigan Indiana Indiana New Jersey
Missouri Iowa Kentucky Rhode Island
New Mexico Kansas Maryland South Carolina
New York Maryland Minnesota Vermont
North Carolina Missouri Mississippi Virginia
Ohio Nebraska Montana
Pennsylvania New Mexico Nevada
Tennessee Oklahoma North Carolina
Texas Pennsylvania North Dakota
West Virginia South Dakota Oklahoma
Tennessee Oregon
Utah South Dakota
Wyoming Washington
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Wisconsin
FN* In Michigan and Ohio (and recently for the Idaho Supreme Court) judicial candidates appear on the general
election ballot without party labels, but their selection and campaigns are otherwise partisan.
FN** In Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania judges are initially elected in partisan elections, but their con-
tinuance is determined in retention elections; New Mexico has a uniquely hybrid process.
FN*** Included here are Connecticut, Maine, South Carolina and Vermont, which elect probate judges. Except
for this note, this Table includes only appellate and general-jurisdiction trial judges.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. Kelly
2002 WL 257559 (U.S. ) (Appellate Brief )
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